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Abstract: When the U.S. Supreme Court declared that same-sex marriage would be 
legal throughout the country, that decision did not end the possibility of other types 
of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has been very unclear about what standard to use when the courts face 
claims of discrimination based on these characteristics. In cases decided under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Court has stated that lower 
courts should use one of three standards, based on the type of discrimination alleged. 
These three standards for review are known as rational basis, intermediate review, 
and strict scrutiny. This article, based on both empirical and normative analysis, will 
explore the proper legal standard that the Supreme Court should use in these cases. 
Since several states have begun to enact laws that encourage discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, this article will argue that the Supreme 
Court should use strict scrutiny in these cases because the LGBT community is clearly 
a discrete and insular minority subject to targeted discrimination. 
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When the Supreme Court of the United States in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) declared that same-sex marriage would be legal 
throughout the country, that decision did not end the possibility of other 
types of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity 
in the United States. After marriage equality, the next gay rights frontier 
in equal protection or anti-discrimination law involves discrimination in 
employment, in housing, over such family law issues as child custody and 
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adoption, and in so-called public accommodations (private businesses and 
other private venues that are open to the entire public plus publically owned 
facilities) (see e.g. Sanders). There is currently no broad overarching feder-
al anti-discrimination law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity (see Sanders, 244), and what protections that 
do exist come from a patchwork of mostly state and local laws plus some 
limited federal regulations (see e.g. Stone, 142-43). 
In fact, in the current political climate, various state and local laws have 
been enacted recently that actually encourage discrimination against lesbi-
an, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT), and other sexually non-conforming 
persons. One study reports that between 2013 and early 2016 there were 20 
anti-LGBT laws enacted in various states. In addition, the number of bills in-
troduced in state legislatures to limit LGBT rights has been increasing greatly 
(Blow). These laws are often couched in terms of protecting the religious lib-
erty of those who have religious objections to homosexuals and other sexu-
ally non-conforming individuals. It is not clear how the U.S. Supreme Court 
will approach these discriminatory laws. The Supreme Court’s decisions 
have been quite vague about the standard of review that the courts should use 
to resolve allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or 
gender identity (see e.g. Mezey, 54-56). This article will argue that American 
courts should use the highest level of review to strike down legislation and 
practices that further discrimination against LGBT individuals.  
The constitutional foundation for all legal anti-discrimination measures in 
the United States is the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, 
which prohibits states and by extension the federal government from deny-
ing “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
With the most notable early example being Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), where the Court declared racial segregation in the 
public schools to be unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court has often 
used the Equal Protection Clause in recent decades to strike down various 
laws that discriminated against specific groups. Equal protection analysis 
is quite complex, with the Supreme Court beginning by determining the 
grouping or classification for the law in question, and then applying one 
of three levels of review for that specific group. Thus, anti-discrimination 
law is primarily based on group membership. As one scholar has explained, 
“Equal protection claims, by their very nature, assume group classifications 
and demand that the group at bar be easily acknowledged and treated the 
same as everyone else” (Pedriana, 73). 
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The three standards or levels of review that the Supreme Court uses when 
approaching discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause are 
the rational basis text, intermediate review, and strict scrutiny. The lowest 
standard of review is the rational basis test, used for most ordinary govern-
mental regulation. This test generally states that for the court to uphold the 
constitutionality of the law the statute in question must be a reasonable mea-
sure designed to achieve a legitimate governmental interest. The intermedi-
ate review test in its original form, used most often for sex discrimination 
claims, states that the law must be substantially related to the achievement 
of an important governmental interest. A heightened level of intermediate 
review sometimes used by the Supreme Court says that the law in question 
must also have an exceedingly persuasive justification. Strict scrutiny, the 
highest standard of review most often employed for suspect classifications 
based on race or other discrete and insular minorities, states that for the stat-
ute to be held constitutional it must be the least restrictive means available 
to achieve a compelling governmental interest (see e.g. Epstein and Walker, 
605). The “discrete and insular minorities” language comes from the Su-
preme Court’s most famous footnote, footnote 4 in its opinion in United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), where the Court 
implied that a heightened level of review would be appropriate for claims of 
discrimination against discrete and insular minorities. Strict scrutiny is used 
for claims of discrimination against suspect classes and for claims that a 
fundamental right has been violated. The fundamental rights acknowledged 
by the Supreme Court in this context include the right to vote, the right to 
travel (meaning the right to live anywhere in the United States), the right 
of individual privacy, and various rights found in the First Amendment (in-
cluding religious rights, free speech rights, and free press rights).
The decision of which standard of review a court should use is an ex-
tremely important one. As a rule of thumb, the Supreme Court usually de-
clares the statute in question to be unconstitutional when it uses the strict 
scrutiny test. As one set of scholars has written, “When the suspect class 
test [strict scrutiny] is used, the Court presumes that the state action is un-
constitutional, and the burden of proof is on the government to demonstrate 
that the law is constitutional” (Epstein and Walker, 603-604). However, the 
Court usually upholds the constitutionality of the law under the rational ba-
sis test. As a different scholar has explained, “The courts afford legislatures 
extreme deference for ordinary economic and social statutes” (Greenawalt, 
364). For intermediate review, sometimes the Court upholds the law and 
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sometimes it strikes it down (see e.g. Fisher and Harringer). This article 
will argue that the U.S. Supreme Court should use strict scrutiny when con-
sidering discrimination against LGBT people. 
In addition to the constitutional protections against discrimination found 
in the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has also enacted a foundational 
anti-discrimination law, the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The federal Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, re-
ligion, and national origin in three protected activities: employment, fed-
erally funded programs like education, and public accommodations. The 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 added disability to the list of pro-
tected groups in the Civil Rights Act. Efforts in Congress began in 1976 to 
add sexual orientation and/or gender identity to the list of protected groups 
in the Civil Rights Act (Klarman, 24), but these efforts have continuously 
failed since then (see Sanders, 244), even though the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives did pass a version of the bill in 2007 (Klarman, 119) and the U.S. 
Senate passed a different version of the bill in 2013 (Davis). In this area 
of the law, the line is often blurred between a discrimination case decided 
on constitutional grounds and a case decided on purely statutory grounds. 
Since many types of discrimination trigger both a constitutional violation 
and a statutory violation, the courts in the United States are not always clear 
in separating these two sources of law. 
As part of the comprehensive anti-discrimination federal law, various 
titles of the Civil Rights Act enacted at different times since 1964 provide 
additional important federal anti-discrimination protections. For example, 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act covers discrimination in the workplace 
context (see Epstein and Walker, 607) while Title IX requires equal treat-
ment of the sexes in all education institutions including secondary educa-
tion and higher education (see Epstein and Walker, 608). The federal Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission has ruled that employment discrim-
ination on the basis of both sexual orientation and gender identity violates 
Title VII. However, it is unclear whether that agency view will be upheld if 
challenged in federal courts (Carpenter). A federal appeals court, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of G.G. v. Gloucester County Board 
of Education (2016), recently accepted the U.S. Department of Education’s 
view that discrimination on the basis of gender identity qualifies as sex 
discrimination and thus violates Title IX. The U.S. Department of Jus-
tice has also claimed that discrimination based on both sexual orientation 
and gender identity violates both Title VII and Title IX (see Lichtblau and 
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Fausset, A1). In 2014, President Obama signed an executive order prohibit-
ing federal contractors from discriminating on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity. The order also protects federal employees from such 
discrimination (Davis). Unfortunately, the order could be easily reversed 
by the next president. In the spring of 2016, Congress considered legisla-
tion that would overrule this executive order (Rein and Demirjian). Then in 
May of 2016 the U.S. House of Representatives voted 213-212 against an 
amendment that would have continued the protection of LGBT employees 
of federal contractors (Werner).  
In addition to these limited federal protections against discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, there is a patchwork 
of state and local anti-discrimination laws. As of September 2015 twenty-
two states and the District of Columbia prohibited discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation, and nineteen of these states plus the District 
of Columbia also prohibited discrimination on the basis of gender identity 
(Sanders). This area of the law is changing quickly. For example, in July 
2016 Massachusetts added gender identity to its anti-discrimination law 
(which already prohibited discrimination due to sexual orientation) (Bern-
hard). Many urban areas, especially in the more conservative states which 
do not have state-wide anti-discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination 
against LGBT people, have enacted local anti-discrimination ordinances to 
protect LGBT individuals (see Robertson and Fausset). However, voters in 
Houston in November of 2014 repealed their local anti-discrimination law 
previously enacted by the city council (Moyer). In a reaction to the local 
laws, three states (Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina) have recently 
enacted state laws that prohibit local anti-discrimination ordinances (Guo, 
2016). Some states such as North Carolina and Mississippi are enacting 
wide-ranging laws that are often seen as allowing anti-LGBT discrimina-
tion (Katz and Eckholm). The Governor of Georgia in 2016 vetoed simi-
lar legislation passed by the Georgia state legislature (Blinder and Perez-
Pena), and in 2015 Indiana and Arkansas rewrote newly enacted religious 
liberty laws that were perceived to encourage discrimination against LGBT 
persons (Guo, 2015). These new laws will be discussed in more detail later 
in the article. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not given consistent answers to questions 
about how lower courts should approach constitutional claims of discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation or gender identity. In fact, in the first ma-
jor gay rights case heard by the Supreme Court, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
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U.S. 186 (1986), the majority of the Court refused to recognize any rights 
for the LGBT community when they failed to strike down a state anti-sod-
omy law. In Bowers, the police lawfully entered a home and discovered two 
men engaged in consensual sex. At the time, the state of Georgia had a stat-
ute prohibiting sodomy. The statute defined sodomy to preclude all homo-
sexual sexual activity as well as a great deal of heterosexual sexual activity. 
Although the police later dropped the charges, Hardwick (one of the men 
who had been arrested) sued, claiming that the Georgia law violated his 
constitutional rights. The majority of the Supreme Court disagreed in a 5-4 
vote against gay rights. The language in Chief Justice Burger’s concurrence 
in the case was an especially harsh attack against homosexual persons in 
general and against the concept of gay rights in particular. The four dissent-
ing justices, however, argued that the Georgia law should be struck down 
on privacy grounds. They also attacked the majority for being homophobic, 
arguing that sexual privacy was important for both heterosexuals and for 
homosexuals (see Richards). The Bowers decision was a major setback for 
LGBT persons. As one commentator has noted, “The gay rights community 
was devastated by Bowers. … Lower courts cited Bowers to justify all man-
ner of discrimination against gays” (Klarman, 37-38). 
Bowers remained the law of the land for decades, until the U.S. Supreme 
Court finally overturned it in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The 
facts in Lawrence were exceptionally similar to those in Bowers. Police law-
fully entered a home in Texas, and discovered two men having consensual 
sex. The men were then arrested under a Texas statute that specifically pro-
hibited homosexual sodomy, unlike the Georgia statute in Bowers which had 
prohibited all types of sodomy. The Texas authorities pursued the criminal 
case, and it eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court. In a 6-3 decision, 
based mostly on the constitutional right of privacy, the Court’s majority opin-
ion written by Justice Kennedy declared the Texas law to be unconstitutional, 
thus overturning the Court’s previous decision in Bowers (see Richards). The 
Court’s opinion, however, did imply that the law also violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Justice Kennedy noted in his Bowers opinion, “When homo-
sexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in 
and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimina-
tion both in the public and in the private spheres” (539 U.S at 575). Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence is also notable because she used the 
Equal Protection Clause instead of the privacy line of precedent to strike 
down the law because the Texas law only targeted homosexual sodomy. Jus-
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tice O’Connor wrote in this case, “A law branding one class of persons as 
criminal solely based on the State’s moral disapproval of that class and the 
conduct associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the Consti-
tution and the Equal Protection Clause, under any standard of review” (539 
U.S. at 585 (2003)). Note, however, that this decision did not answer the 
question of what standard of review future courts should use to decide dis-
crimination claims based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 
The first major gay rights decision from the U.S. Supreme Court to use the 
Equal Protection Clause to protect LGBT people was Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996). This case involved an amendment to the state Constitution 
of Colorado that prohibited local anti-discrimination laws on the basis of 
sexual orientation. The state constitutional amendment was unambiguous 
in targeting the LGBT community specifically. Liberal cities in Colorado 
like Denver, Aspen, and Boulder started passing local anti-discrimination 
laws that included discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In other 
words, the local anti-discrimination ordinances treated discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation the same as discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, religion, national origin, or disability. Conservatives in the state 
were outraged, and the voters then amended the state constitution to out-
law such local anti-discrimination ordinances or to give “special rights” 
to LGBT individuals. Interestingly, the state Supreme Court of Colorado 
struck down the state constitutional amendment as violating the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The state supreme court used the 
strict scrutiny test in their decision. In a vote of 6-3, the U.S. Supreme 
Court in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy also declared the state con-
stitutional amendment to be in violation of the federal constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause, but the majority on the nation’s highest court used the 
rational basis test instead of strict scrutiny (see Mezey, 59-64). Romer is 
the notable exception where the Supreme Court declared a law to be un-
constitutional using the rational basis test. On the one hand, Romer was a 
major victory for the gay rights movement, where Justice Kennedy wrote a 
“passionate” opinion striking down the discriminatory law (see Knowles, 
94). On the other hand, the Kennedy opinion provided no guidance to future 
courts on the question of what standard of review should be used for claims 
of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, much less gender iden-
tity (see e.g. Farber and Sherry). The Court’s refusal to state what level of 
review was appropriate for Equal Protection claims for discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation continues to this day.  
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Same-sex marriage was the next issue for the Supreme Court’s Equal 
Protection analysis in this area, involving three separate same-sex marriage 
decisions. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) is the first same-
sex marriage decision from the Supreme Court, but it did nothing to explain 
what standard of review the courts should use for discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. In June of 2008, the California Supreme Court declared 
that there was a right to same-sex marriage under the state constitution. In 
November of 2008, the voters in the state amended the state constitution to 
prohibit same-sex marriage through the passage of Proposition 8. A law-
suit was then filed, which claimed that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional. 
The trial judge on the U.S. District Court found that Proposition 8 was in 
fact unconstitutional under the federal constitution, using the strict scru-
tiny standard of review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
agreed with the District Court’s outcome, but instead found Proposition 8 
to be unconstitutional using the rational basis test. When the case reached 
the U.S. Supreme Court, state officials refused to defend Proposition 8. 
The U.S. Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the case, but instead 
ruled that the parties defending the constitutionality of Proposition 8 did not 
have standing to bring the case to court. Thus, based solely on the techni-
cal question of standing, the Supreme Court reverted to the circuit court’s 
ruling that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, without reaching the Equal 
Protection issue. Same-sex marriage became legal in the state of California, 
but the precedent established in Hollingworth was extremely narrow and 
did not apply to same-sex marriage bans imposed by other states nor by the 
federal government. 
The next U.S. Supreme Court ruling regarding same-sex marriage came 
in United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). In this case, the Supreme 
Court struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act of 1996. Congress 
passed this statute in reaction to a decision by the Hawaii Supreme Court 
in Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993) that declared that the 
state constitution required same-sex marriage (see Pinello, 25-29). The Ha-
waii court used strict scrutiny in interpreting the state constitution’s equal 
protection clause. It also appeared that the Alaska Supreme Court might be 
moving in the same direction (see Klarman, 66-68). The state legislatures in 
both these states quickly amended their state constitutions to prohibit same-
sex marriage before any actual same-sex marriages were performed, and 
the voters approved these constitutional amendments. Nevertheless, even 
though same-sex marriage was at that point still hypothetical, Congress 
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quickly passed the federal Defense of Marriage Act and President Clinton 
quietly signed the bill into law just before the 1996 elections. The federal 
Defense of Marriage Act stated that for federal purposes marriage would be 
defined as only between one man and one woman. The Act also allowed the 
states to ignore same-sex marriages performed in other states (see Mezey, 
98-101). 
The federal Defense of Marriage Act had no real effect until Massachu-
setts became the first state to make gay marriages a reality after the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 
Mass. 309, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (2003) declared a right to same-sex marriage 
under the Massachusetts constitution. In the Goodridge decision, the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court used strict scrutiny in interpreting the 
state constitution’s equal protection clause. Soon other state courts began 
to follow the Massachusetts example, including California, Connecticut, 
and Iowa. Eventually judges in 26 states invalidated state bans on same-sex 
marriage (Epstein and Walker, 438). State legislatures in many Northeastern 
states including New York, Vermont, and New Hampshire enacted same-
sex marriage legislation, and the voters in Maine, Maryland, and Wash-
ington approved same-sex marriage ballot initiatives in 2012 (New York 
Times). The spread of same-sex marriage through various states brought 
with it a series of lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act. 
Specifically, the Windsor case involved two women who were lawfully 
married under New York law. When one of the spouses died, the federal 
government subjected her estate to federal estate taxes because the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) prevented the federal government from 
recognizing the same-sex marriage. Under federal law, there is no federal 
estate tax due when a spouse dies and the estate automatically passes to 
the surviving spouse. The surviving spouse, Windsor, sued, claiming that 
the federal Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional under the federal 
constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit struck down the federal law as unconstitutional, using the 
intermediate review standard under the theory that discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation was equivalent to sex discrimination. The Cir-
cuit Court ruled that homosexuals were a “quasi-suspect class” to justify 
their use of intermediate review (Klarman, 363). The Obama Administra-
tion refused to defend the Defense of Marriage Act in the courts (Fisher and 
Harringer, 914). 
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In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy in U.S. v. Windsor, the U.S. 
Supreme Court declared the federal Defense of Marriage Act to be uncon-
stitutional, but mostly on federalism grounds with due process and equal 
protection overtones. The states had a right to protect various groups from 
discrimination, and Congress had no right to interfere with these state pro-
tections. As Justice Kennedy wrote, “DOMA seeks to injure the very class 
New York seeks to protect. By doing so it violates basic due process and 
equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government. … The 
Constitution’s guarantee of equality must at the very least mean that a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify 
disparate treatment of that group” (133 S.Ct. at 2693). While the Court’s 
majority clearly saw DOMA as violating the Equal Protection Clause, the 
opinion does not address the question of what standard future judges should 
use in deciding cases claiming discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity. Interestingly, almost all federal courts read Windsor 
as precedent for striking down state same-sex marriage bans (Epstein and 
Walker, 438).
The most recent case in the same-sex marriage trilogy is Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). While the vast majority of U.S. circuit 
courts of appeals were declaring state bans on same-sex marriage to be un-
constitutional, the Sixth Circuit ruled the other way, using the rational basis 
test from Romer. The U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case, and overturned 
the Sixth Circuit’s decision. In this case, the Supreme Court in an opinion 
again written by Justice Kennedy declared unconstitutional all state bans on 
same-sex marriages. Also, all states had to recognize same-sex marriages 
performed in other states. The Court’s majority opinion in this landmark 
case did say that same-sex marriage was a fundamental right of privacy that 
implicated equal protection rights as well. Wrote Justice Kennedy, “The na-
ture of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can 
find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is 
true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation” (135 S.Ct. at 2599). 
Thus, this ruling stated that state bans on same-sex marriage violated the 
U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause without elaborating on what 
standard the courts should use for future cases of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity. 
While academics and others on the left cheered the results in Obergefell, 
there nevertheless was much concern that the Court failed to declare LGBT 
persons to be a suspect class that deserved the protection of strict scrutiny 
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review. Although some judges and academics have long suggested that dis-
crimination against LGBT individuals should receive strict scrutiny, Justice 
Kennedy, the main author of the Supreme Court’s gay rights decisions, has 
never endorsed that view. Scholars such as John Hart Ely in the early 1980’s 
called for the LGBT community to be considered a discrete and insular mi-
nority and thus treated as a suspect class (Ely 162-64). As Mohr explained 
in 1988, “If given the status of a suspect class with attendant Constitutional 
protections under the fourteenth amendment, gays would be largely spared 
legislation that is targeted against them” (Mohr, 169). 
In all of his gay rights opinions, Justice Kennedy has refused to use tra-
ditional equal protection analysis, instead relying on notions of human dig-
nity that reject animus toward specific groups. Noting that Justice Kennedy 
was the author of all of the Supreme Court’s opinions advancing gay rights, 
Peter Nicolas observes that, “As both the author and often the deciding vote 
in each of these four cases, Justice Kennedy will no doubt leave behind one 
of the most important gay rights legacies in U.S. legal history” (Nicolas, 
137). But this scholar goes on to conclude that in failing to use strict scruti-
ny or at least intermediate review for cases involving LGBT discrimination, 
gay rights did not advance as far as they should have. According to Nicolas, 
“This heightened level of scrutiny would in turn give gays and lesbians a 
measure of repose, affording them the same certainty that racial minori-
ties and women have that laws targeting them are unlikely to be upheld by 
courts today” (Nicolas, 138). Another commentator, David Bernstein, was 
especially harsh in his criticism of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell. 
Bernstein wrote, “Justice Kennedy’s opinion implicitly continues his cam-
paign to undermine post-New Deal constitutional doctrine on due process 
and equal protection. … Kennedy does not even address the possibility that 
homosexuals are a suspect class (which to my mind would have been the 
strongest rationale for the Court’s decision)” (Bernstein). 
So far, Kennedy’s concept of human dignity has resulted in gay rights 
victories. This concept seems deeply embedded in Kennedy’s judicial phi-
losophy. As Colucci notes, “Kennedy’s opinions across several areas of 
constitutional law sketch an ideal of human dignity shaped in rhetoric and 
substance by post-Vatican II Catholicism. He cites social science research, 
economic and social developments, and comparative constitutional law as 
objective referents to justify his conceptions of liberty and dignity” (Coluc-
ci, 170). Kennedy’s notion of human dignity, however, does not provide as 
much protection to the LGBT community as would suspect class treatment. 
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Thus, Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence leaves the rational basis test as the 
only level of analysis available for courts that face constitutional claims of 
discrimination against LGBT people. As Epstein and Walker note, “Despite 
the importance of Obergefell, Romer v. Evans remains the Court’s most 
significant interpretation of the equal protection clause as it applies to clas-
sifications based on sexual orientation” (Epstein and Walker, 689).  
Critics on the right were of course also quite unhappy with the Supreme 
Court’s Obergefell decision. For example, Kim Davis, an obscure county 
clerk in Kentucky, became quite famous worldwide when she refused to is-
sue marriage licenses for same-sex couples after the Court’s ruling (Blind-
er). Conservative politicians also reacted quite negatively to the Supreme 
Court’s decision. Several states rushed to pass so-called Religious Freedom 
Restoration Acts that would have allowed individuals on religious grounds 
to refuse to provide services to same-sex couples. In 2015, the state leg-
islatures in Indiana and Arkansas enacted so-called religious liberty bills 
that critics said would allow open discrimination against LGBT people. 
Under intense pressure from the business community, Indiana then quickly 
amended its law to prevent the use of the law in discrimination suits based 
on sexual orientation or gender identity. Arkansas also changed its law 
due to business pressure, although the actual practical effects of the new 
law in Arkansas remain murky (Guo, 2015). In 2016, Mississippi enacted 
a sweeping new state law that allowed businesses to refuse to give ser-
vice to LGBT people on the basis of religious objections to homosexuality 
or gender non-conformity (Guo, 2016). The Mississippi law attempted to 
protect the religious views of those who oppose same-sex marriage, who 
oppose sex outside of marriage, and who believe that a person’s gender is 
determined at birth. Opponents said that the law encouraged discrimina-
tion against LGBT individuals. A federal trial judge on the U.S. District 
Court in Mississippi declared the law to be unconstitutional in 2016, and 
refused to allow it to go into effect (Associated Press). State legislatures in 
Arizona (Guo, 2015), Virginia (Fausset), and Georgia (Blinder and Perez-
Pena) also have passed similar religious freedom laws, but the governors of 
those states vetoed the bills, in large part because of the strong opposition 
of business interests to them. The intent of the legislatures was clear: they 
wanted to find a legal mechanism for religiously motivated people to avoid 
supporting LGBT rights. 
Conservatives in various state legislatures were also concerned that gay 
rights were creeping into their states through local anti-discrimination ordi-
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nances designed to protect the rights of LGBT people. In response to these 
local anti-discrimination ordinances that would have provided protection 
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, 
three states have recently enacted state laws that overrule these local dis-
crimination ordinances. The state legislatures in Arkansas, Tennessee, and 
North Carolina preempted local governmental anti-discrimination efforts in 
Fayetteville, Nashville, and Charlotte respectively (Guo, 2016). Conserva-
tive state legislators were very upset with the actions taken by the more lib-
eral cities in their states. The conservatives felt that the only way to prevent 
the spread of gay rights laws was to outlaw them at the state level. At first 
blush, it appears that these state laws would be in direct violation of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans. The main difference, however, 
is while the Colorado law at issue in Romer specifically targeted discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation, the new generation of laws are silent 
on what type of local anti-discrimination laws are preempted by the state 
laws (Guo, 2016). The writers of these laws have learned from the past, 
and they hope that the courts will not strike down their state prohibitions 
against local anti-discrimination laws because they do not directly mention 
local laws designed to protect the LGBT community. Even though the state 
bans on local anti-discrimination laws are carefully worded, their intent is 
unambiguous. As Guo notes, “The impact of these laws is clear though. In 
North Carolina, for instance, the immediate effect will be to make LGBT 
discrimination legal again in Charlotte” (Guo, 2016). 
Perhaps the most sweeping of the new anti-LGBT laws is the one passed 
in North Carolina in March of 2016. The new law has three general provi-
sions (see Fausset and Blinder, A12). First, the law created a new state-
wide anti-discrimination policy that intentionally left out discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. This part of the law then 
prohibits local anti-discrimination ordinances that provide more protection 
than the state law. Secondly, the law prohibits many discrimination suits 
from being filed in state courts. Third, in reaction to local laws that pro-
tect the rights of transgendered people, the North Carolina law requires 
that individuals must use the public restroom, shower, or changing room of 
the sex that is on their birth certificate. In effect, it prevents transgendered 
people from using the bathroom and other facilities of their choice if their 
gender identity does not match the sex listed on their birth certificate (see 
Fausset and Blinder, A12). Like in many states, it is very difficult to change 
the sex on a birth certificate in North Carolina short of sex reassignment 
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surgery (Ross). The state legislature in South Dakota passed a similar anti-
transgender bill in 2016, but the governor vetoed it (Smith). 
There was intense outrage after the passage of the North Carolina anti-
LGBT law. The American Civil Liberties Union immediately filed suit, ar-
guing that the North Carolina law violated the federal Constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause. The federal government argued that the new law also 
violated federal statutes, including the Civil Rights Act. The federal govern-
ment also threatened to cut off well over $1 billion dollars in federal aid to 
the state, and especially to the University of North Carolina higher education 
system (Robertson, A2). Many businesses threatened to stop doing business 
in the state, governmental officials from more liberal states forbade their 
employees to travel to North Carolina, and several famous musicians such 
as Bruce Springsteen cancelled concerts in the state (Fausset and Blinder, 
A12). The National Basketball Association (NBA) also moved its 2017 all-
star game from Charlotte to New Orleans because of the new law (Martel). 
The state’s Republican Governor, Pat McCrory, was running for reelec-
tion in 2016 and fully supported the new legislation. In response to the 
intense protests against the new law, however, he did sign an executive 
order granting some protections to state employees who are gay or lesbian. 
He also said he would ask the legislature to allow state courts to hear dis-
crimination suits again. McCrory’s Democratic opponent in the November 
2016 election for Governor, state Attorney General Roy Cooper, refused 
to defend the new law in court, saying that it was clearly unconstitutional 
(Fausset and Blinder, A15). 
North Carolina is part of the federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and 
it appears that the transgender provisions in the state law violate federal civ-
il rights statutes and thus are illegal, according to the recent Fourth Circuit 
decision in G.G v. Gloucester County School Board,—F.3d.—(Fourth Cir-
cuit 2016). Not surprisingly, it seems that Governor McCrory has not men-
tioned that recent federal appeals court decision. Like many conservatives, 
McCrory has focused on the dangers of allowing transgendered people 
into the restroom of their choice, saying that the practice would encourage 
men (whether transgendered or not) to attack women in the bathrooms. As 
one commentator has noted, “Activists have used the bathroom debate as 
a venue for rolling back broader civil rights protections, arguing that al-
lowing transgender people into the supposedly safe spaces of single-sex 
bathrooms creates dangerous scenarios and violates privacy and common 
sense” (Balingit). 
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In reaction to threats from the federal government to cut off federal funds 
to the state, Governor McCrory filed suit against the federal government, 
arguing that the federal Department of Justice and other federal agencies 
that claimed that the law violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 
and Title IX were advocating a “radical reinterpretation” of the nation’s civil 
rights statutes and a “baseless and blatant overreach” of federal power over 
the states. Governor McCrory called on Congress to clarify the law, arguing 
that the Obama Administration was bypassing Congress through its bureau-
cratic interpretations of the civil rights statutes, which he claimed afforded 
no protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or 
gender identity. He also said that the concept of gender identity cannot be 
defined by the law. Finally, the Governor refused to accept the federal gov-
ernment’s assertion that the new state law openly encouraged discrimination 
against LGBT people (Blinder, Perez-Pena, and Lichtblau, A1). 
The federal Department of Justice (DOJ) responded to the state’s lawsuit 
by filing a suit of their own just hours after the state filed its suit, claim-
ing that the North Carolina law was in clear violation of the federal civil 
rights statutes because discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity is simply a version of sex discrimination that is clearly pro-
hibited by federal laws. U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch argued, 
“This is about the dignity and respect that we accord our fellow citizens 
and the laws that we as a people and a country have enacted to protect 
them” (quoted in Berman and Larimer, A2). Attorney General Lynch then 
compared discrimination against LGBT people to historical discrimination 
on the basis of race. As the Attorney General noted by alluding to the Jim 
Crow racial segregation laws of the past, “It was not so very long ago that 
states, including North Carolina, had other signs above restrooms, water 
fountains and on public accommodations, keeping people out based on a 
distinction without a difference” (quoted in Perez-Pena and Lewin, A11). 
The Department of Justice and the Department of Education followed up 
their lawsuit by sending a letter to all schools and universities in the coun-
try, stating that these educational institutions must protect the rights of 
transgendered individuals to use the facilities of their choice. The letter 
threatened lawsuits for any school or university that does not comply with 
the Obama Administration’s interpretation of the federal civil rights statutes 
(Davis and Apuzzo). In response, 11 states sued the federal government, 
claiming that the Obama Administration’s interpretation of the civil rights 
laws exceeded its authority (Montgomery and Blinder).
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It is possible that the courts will treat claims based on sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity differently. The federal Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, the federal Department of Education, and the federal 
Department of Justice have clearly stated their view the word “sex” in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its accompanying legislation includes gender 
identity. Thus, discrimination against transgendered individuals could be 
covered under the Civil Rights Act without also offering the same protec-
tion against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. While the 
U.S. Supreme Court has been silent on the rights of transgendered indi-
viduals, several U.S. Courts of Appeals have taken a position on the issue, 
most siding with the rights of transgendered persons. In 2004, the Sixth 
Circuit ruled that discrimination against transgendered people is sex dis-
crimination under the Civil Rights Act, as did the Eleventh Circuit in 2011 
and the Fourth Circuit in 2016. However, in 2007 the Tenth Circuit went 
the other way, finding no protections for transgendered individuals in fed-
eral anti-discrimination laws (Perez-Pena and Lewin, A11). It is also pos-
sible that the courts will treat discrimination against transgendered people 
as the same as sex discrimination for constitutional purposes, and thus use 
the same intermediate review equal protection analysis used in determin-
ing constitutionally based sex discrimination cases. It is also conceivable 
that discrimination on the basis of gender identity would be covered under 
the federal civil rights statutes, while discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation would only be covered by constitutional claims. That would still 
leave constitutional discrimination claims based on sexual orientation to 
receive the rational basis test under the Romer precedent.
Thus, the North Carolina anti-LGBT law and other similar state laws may 
eventually force the U.S. Supreme Court to decide what level of review 
future courts should use for constitutional claims of discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Maybe the Supreme Court will 
apply the same analysis to these two types of discrimination and perhaps it 
will treat them differently. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court needs to clarify 
the situation. Perhaps the Court will follow the Romer precedent and use the 
rational basis test to declare these state attacks on LGBT people to be uncon-
stitutional. But a much better approach would be for the Supreme Court to 
recognize that LGBT individuals and other gender non-conforming persons 
are a suspect class that should be thought of in terms of a discrete and insu-
lar minority. Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed with this conclusion in 
their dissent to the denial of certiorari in Rowland v. Mad River Local School 
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District, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985), when they stated, “Homosexuals constitute 
a significant and insular minority of this country’s population … [and] have 
historically been the object of pernicious and sustained hostility.”
The recently enacted anti-LGBT state laws seem to prove the fact that 
the LGBT community is being specifically targeted for discrimination, in 
part as a backlash against the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage deci-
sions. At a minimum, the Court should treat constitutional claims of dis-
crimination against LGBT people as deserving intermediate review such 
as sex discrimination cases now receive. But LGBT people are clearly a 
suspect class that deserves the protection of strict scrutiny analysis in equal 
protection cases. As one commentator has concluded, “The Court’s failure 
to declare sexual orientation a suspect classification has resulted in concrete 
harm to gays and lesbians” (Nicolas, 142). If anything, the new generation 
of state anti-LGBT laws prove that the Court’s approval of same-sex mar-
riage has not eliminated other forms of discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity. The Supreme Court needs to take action to 
protect this vulnerable minority. 
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